As a society, all behaviors are an expression of one’s values. These values lead to certain predictable behaviors, which in turn become norms, and these norms become codified as law.
These laws act as the social contract between all of the different groups of societies. Networks of political patronage, business relationships, family and friend connections act as complex webs of information and value exchange.
This leads to the emergence of social structures. In Lebanon’s case, the social structure is the the sectarian clientelistic rentier mafia vassal state.
It was once famously declared in Parliament that, contrary to the principles of the constitution, “MPs do not work for the public opinion, they work for the internal system”.
Under these rules of the game, building a state was the anti-thesis to the survival of the system.
As a young republic, Lebanon was unable to handle internal and external challenges and quickly became a weak state rife with sectarianism, feudalism, clientelism, mafia rules, and diplomatic subservience.
The subdimensions of this social system – sectarian (sociopolitical), clientelistic (political), feudalistic (socioeconomic), rentier (economic) – all emerged from Ottoman era and feed off teach others.
The accumulation of wealth in the 50s and 60s did not translate into a sustainable and inclusive system which could build a strong state granting equal protection and opportunities to all citizens. Attempts to build a state were often countered by opposing interests.
Mafia rules (political) and diplomatic subservience (political) increased after the collapse of the state in the 80s, which further entrenched relationships dictated by clientelism (political), turbocharging in the process the rentier economy into a form of neo-feudalism.
On the security front, the hostile geopolitical climate led the Lebanese to compromise for a mafia state to obtain temporary stability, while Lebanon’s military-security apparatus became more deeply tied to regional stakes and influences.
Despite redistributing political powers more equitably, the Taef Agreement weakened the agency and efficiency of the executive branch by transferring powers in Article 17 from the president to the Council of Ministers. The latter has operated under fragmented leadership and divergent agendas. With the addition of “consensual democracy” as a mode of government, enshrined in the 08 Doha Agreement, institutional deadlocks became the norm, rather than the exception.
To improve the outputs of our social system (the outputs can be thought of as the aggregate of all the fundamentals of the crisis discussed in previous sections), it is required to change both the inputs and the parameters of the system.
The people in charge – as well as all other factors that produce the social good – are the inputs.
The parameters are the social sub-dimensions of the system, whether political or purely economic – sectarian (sociopolitical), clientelistic (political), feudalistic (socioeconomic), rentier (economic), mafia state (political), vassal state (political).
Changing these sub-structures essentially involves changes in society’s dominant values plus radical institutional changes, all through reforms. Once mechanisms for transparency and accountability are implemented, new institutions can arise and new state based on national citizenship, meritocracy, economic prosperity and sovereignty can emerge.