Lebanon’s current crisis is partly a symptom that its current constitutional structure is unfit for effective governance.

While a change in the social pact is inevitable at some point, there are differing opinions on whether Lebanon should become a secular decentralized unitary state, a federal sectarian state or a federal state based on geographic divisions.

The April 13 alliance of the revolution advocates for a civil personal status code, optional for people at a first stage, and the removal of sectarian quotas in all factions of the government except for a lower senate that only deals with existential issues of sects. This would essentially entail a soft secularism close to the Indian model.

There are two aspects to Lebanon’s sectarianism: the personal status law and the sectarian quotas in government branches.

There are 15 separate personal status laws for the country’s different recognized religious communities, a system passed down from the Ottoman era’s millet court system. Each community has its own court for matters related to family, marriage, divorce and inheritance.

Other than the personal status laws, Lebanon is currently a civil state. The sectarian quotas can effectively be viewed as a de facto decentralization of power in a small pluralistic society.

Philosophically, pluralistic societies face divergent views and interests on fundamental aspects of how governments should function. These can be broken down into the economic, cultural and diplomatic spheres.

Economically, the consolidation of power into the hands of one main dominant socio-political group can yield imbalances in the way infrastructure, services, state jobs and public goods are provisioned.

Culturally, pluralistic societies can hold different value systems, related to education, language, public space allocation, and customs. The personal status laws are essentially one component of this cultural dimension.

Diplomatically, the issue of state relations and security alliances can be divisive in terms of which international alliances the state should join

Sectarian quotas were in essence a way of finding a balance to the interests of the diverse socio-religious communities in Lebanon. The intentions clearly did not produce the intended results, with economic collapse, cultural decline, and lack of security all a reality.

Political sectarianism is not inherently good or bad, it is simply outdated. While the constitution clearly states that political sectarianism should only be temporary, no steps forward have been taken to this day by the political class.

The solutions to all three aspects exist but are harder to implement. Administrative decentralization, a strong national identity, and neutrality in diplomatic alignments are essentially the way to strike the balance for a new social pact, while preserving the specific interests of all communities.